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Abstract
In this paper we study the supply function competition between power-generation firms with different
levels of flexibility. Inflexible firms produce power at a constant rate over an operating horizon, while
flexible firms can adjust their output to meet the fluctuations in electricity demand. Both types of firms
compete in an electricity market by submitting supply functions to a system operator, who solves an
optimal dispatch problem to determine the production level for each firm and the corresponding market
price. We study how firms’ (in)flexibility affects their equilibrium behavior and the market price. We
also analyze the impact of variable generation (such as wind and solar power) on the equilibrium, with
the focus on the effects of the amount of variable generation, its priority in dispatch, and the production-
based subsidies. We find that the classic supply function equilibrium model overestimates the intensity
of the market competition, and even more so as more variable generation is introduced into the system.
The policy of economically curtailing variable generation intensifies the market competition, reduces
price volatility, and improves the system’s overall efficiency. Moreover, we show that these benefits are
most significant in the absence of the production-based subsidies.
Key words: electricity market; supply function equilibrium; flexible/inflexible generators; variable gen-
eration; economic curtailment; production-based subsidies
1. Introduction
The special nature of the electricity industry (quick and random fluctuations of demand, limited
storage capability) requires production decisions to be automated and coordinated instantaneously.
Thus, in an electricity market, the instruments of competition are supply functions, which specify the
amount of electricity each firm is willing to generate at every market price. Based on the submitted
supply functions, a system operator finds the most economical production schedule to meet the
electricity demand and determines the payment to each firm. A set of supply functions from which
no firm would benefit by unilaterally changing its supply function is known as a supply function
equilibrium (SFE). Klemperer and Meyer (1989) pioneered the effort in analyzing the SFE in general
industrial contexts. Green and Newbery (1992) and Bolle (1992) are the first to employ the SFE
framework to analyze electricity markets. These seminal studies and the following stream of research
provide important economic insights and policy recommendations, which we will review in §2.
Most SFE models for electricity markets assume that all firms have the flexibility to adjust their
power output at different prices. This assumption can be justified in two situations. First, each firm
owns a portfolio of power generators and offers the aggregate supply as a function of the market
price. The portfolio consists of inflexible generators (e.g., nuclear and some coal-fired generators)
as well as flexible generators (e.g., oil- and gas-fired generators), and the aggregate output can be
adjusted in response to the price changes throughout the day. This situation is studied by Green and
Newbery (1992), Green (1996), Rudkevich (1999), Baldick, Grant, and Kahn (2004), among others.
Second, in the real-time market that runs and clears every hour (or half-hour in some markets), firms
with flexible generators submit real-time supply offers to meet the energy imbalance (the energy that
deviates from the day-ahead schedule). This situation is considered by, for example, Holmberg (2007,
2008). The theoretical framework of SFE is applicable to both situations, as discussed in Anderson
and Philpott (2002) and Holmberg and Newbery (2010).
The assumption of production-adjustment flexibility, however, may not always be appropriate. As
industry deregulation continues, firms downsize their portfolios by selling off part of their generation
assets and independent power producers emerge to participate in the power markets. As a result, in
many current markets, firms that own mainly inflexible generators cannot change their power output
in a short time, whereas firms owning mostly flexible generators can quickly adjust their output.
All firms engage in a supply function competition in the day-ahead market and the system operator
determines the production schedule taking into account the firms’ different levels of flexibility.
The classic SFE model does not address competitions involving inflexible firms, but intuitively
the level of flexibility directly affects a firm’s production, revenue, and its competitive behavior.
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Thus, the first two natural questions we ask are: How do firms with different levels of flexibility
behave in a supply function competition? How does the presence of inflexibility affect the equilibrium
market price? Answers to these questions will help policy makers understand whether the classic
SFE model may over- or under-estimate the intensity of the market competition. The understanding
of the effect of generation flexibility/inflexibility on competition is especially important given the
rapid evolution of generation mix, with coal-fired generation shifting toward more flexible generation
fueled by natural gas.
An important part of the evolution is the increasing use of renewable energy sources, notably
solar and wind power, which are often referred to as variable generation. According to the Renewable
Energy Policy Network (2013), globally the fastest growing renewable energy technologies from 2008
to 2012 are solar photovoltaic, concentrating solar thermal power, and wind power, with average
annual capacity growth rates of 60%, 43%, and 25%, respectively. Variable generation from renewable
sources displaces conventional flexible and inflexible generation, and thus changes the competition
between them, which raises another question: How does variable generation impact the competition
between flexible and inflexible firms?
The impact of variable generation depends on the system’s priority dispatching rule. Due to
its environmental and economic benefits, variable generation is often given the highest priority in
dispatch, i.e., it is curtailed only when the excessive energy from variable generation threatens system
reliability. However, curtailing variable generation may also provide economic benefits, as shown by
Ela (2009), Ela and Edelson (2012), and Wu and Kapuscinski (2013). Consequently, many system
operators started to develop market mechanisms for economic curtailment. Hence, a relevant question
is: How does the economic curtailment policy affect the competition between flexible and inflexible
firms? A caveat is that even if economic curtailment policy is in effect, the production-based subsidies
for renewable energy may lead to partial economic curtailment. Therefore, in addressing the last
question, we also examine the case of partial economic curtailment.
Our objective in this paper is to address the four questions raised above through theoretical and
computational analysis of a stylized model that captures the most relevant tradeoffs. We assume that
each firm owns either inflexible generators (IG) or fully flexible generators (FG) or variable generators
(VG). An IG firm produces power at a constant rate over an operating horizon (e.g., several hours
to one day); an FG firm can adjust its output to meet the demand fluctuations. IG and FG firms
submit supply functions to a system operator. VG output is considered as negative demand when VG
has priority in dispatch; when economic curtailment is allowed, VG firms are assumed to be price-
takers and submit their marginal cost determined by the production-based subsidies. We formulate
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the system operator’s optimal dispatch problem and derive the market clearing condition. We then
characterize and compute the SFE between FG and IG firms with linear supply functions, commonly
adopted both in practice and in the research literature. We further study the impact of the amount
of variable generation (referred to as VG penetration), its dispatch policy, and the subsidies.
The main insights from this paper are summarized below. First, by assuming all firms are
flexible, the classic SFE model overestimates the intensity of the supply function competition. In our
equilibrium model, because IGs do not compete with FGs in matching production with uncertain
demand, FGs face less competition and offer significantly lower output than predicted by the classic
SFE model. FGs’ less competitive behavior induces IGs (who still compete with all other generators
for market share) to offer slightly lower output than in the classic model. Consequently, our model
leads to a higher average price and a higher price volatility than predicted by the classic SFE model.
Second, when the rising VG penetration increases the overall variability facing the system, if VGs
have priority, the system operator has to balance the increased variability by using FGs rather than
IGs, which allows FGs to have an advantage in the market-share competition with IGs. To profit
from this advantage, FGs reduce their supply functions, i.e., offer lower output at each price. Thus,
as VG penetration increases, the market becomes less competitive.
Third, economic curtailment of VG provides the system operator with an additional lever to
balance against variability and serves as a partial substitute for FGs. Thus, economic curtailment
intensifies the market competition: IGs and FGs offer more competitive supply functions than if
VGs have priority; IGs’ supply functions may be even more competitive than in the classic SFE
model. Economic curtailment has little impact on the average price, but substantially reduces the
price volatility. The overall operating cost of the system is also reduced by economic curtailment,
but emissions may increase or decrease depending on the generators’ fuel types.
Finally, production-based subsidies increase the priority of variable generation and reduce the
amount of curtailment. Thus, in the presence of the subsidies, the economic curtailment policy does
not achieve its full benefit to encourage competition and improve system efficiency.
2. Literature Review
In their original work, Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show the existence of a family of SFE for
competing firms with identical cost functions and without capacity constraints. They characterize
the SFE by differential equations and show that, given the support of the uncertainty, the equilibria
are independent of the distribution of the uncertainty. Since this seminal work, the SFE framework
has been applied extensively to the research in electricity markets. Comprehensive reviews of this
area are provided by Ventosa et al. (2005), Holmberg and Newbery (2010), and Li, Shi, and Qu
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(2011). Thus, we review below only the works most relevant to our paper.
Many studies focus on the case of symmetric equilibria, in which firms offer identical supply
functions. Green and Newbery (1992) calibrate the SFE model for the British electricity industry
and their results suggest that the market power had been seriously underestimated by the policy
makers. Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen (1998) study symmetric SFE with inelastic demand,
and find that even with a relatively high number of competing firms, the market clearing prices are
still significantly higher than perfectly competitive prices. Anderson and Philpott (2002) derive the
conditions under which a supply function can represent a firm’s optimal response to the offers of
other firms and show that their model admits symmetric SFE. Holmberg (2008) proves the SFE is
unique when power shortage occurs with positive probability and a price cap exists.
When firms differ in costs, the general asymmetric equilibria are difficult to find and, thus,
linear supply functions are often used to simplify the analysis. Green (1996) solves the asymmetric
equilibrium with linear supply functions and studies the effects of various policies that could increase
the competition in the electricity market. Rudkevich (1999) provides a more explicit solution to
the SFE with linear supply functions and further finds that this equilibrium could be reached by a
learning process. In this paper, we also analyze SFE with linear supply functions and extend the
above studies by considering asymmetries in both cost and flexibility.
Physical constraints such as capacities and network transmission constraints are important areas
in the SFE literature. SFE models with capacity constraints are considered by Green and Newbery
(1992), Baldick et al. (2004), Holmberg (2007), Anderson and Hu (2008), Genc and Reynolds (2011)
and Anderson (2013). SFE models with network transmission constraints are studied by Berry et al.
(1999), Wilson (2008), and Holmberg and Philpott (2012). This paper complements these studies by
focusing on firms’ production-adjustment constraints. A key feature of our model is that the firms’
(in)flexibility is incorporated in the system operator’s optimal dispatch problem, and the resulting
optimality condition serves as a constraint in the firm-level profit-maximization problem. Our ap-
proach shares similar features with the MPEC (mathematical program with equilibrium constraints)
approach introduced by Hobbs, Metzler, and Pang (2000).
Constraints may also rise from market rules. Supatgiat, Zhang, and Birge (2001) study the
Nash equilibria when the price bids are restricted to a discrete set and each firm offers a single
price-quantity pair. They characterize the firms’ equilibrium behavior and market clearing price.
Several empirical studies have been conducted to compare the SFE prediction with actual market
data. Sioshansi and Oren (2007) find evidence that generators in the Texas electricity market bid
less competitively than predicted by the SFE model. Willems et al. (2009) find similar evidence in
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the German electricity market and include constant correction terms in their model. The first insight
obtained in this paper, mentioned in the introduction, is consistent with these empirical findings.
Integration of variable generation into electricity systems has received substantial research atten-
tion over the past decade. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory recently completed two large
variable generation integration studies: the Western Wind and Solar Integration Study (WWSIS)
(GE Energy 2010) and the Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study (EWITS) (EnerNex
2011). Reviews of these and earlier variable generation studies are provided by Smith et al. (2007),
Ela et al. (2009), and Hart et al. (2012). Most of these integration studies focus on quantifying
system cost reduction due to variable generation, as well as the integration cost, i.e., the incremental
cost in balancing against variable generation.
The impact of variable generation on the SFE in electricity markets has not been considered until
recently. Sioshansi (2011) considers a Stackelberg game with wind-power generators deciding output
followed by a supply function competition among conventional generators. Assuming wind-power
generators are price-takers and have priority, Buygi, Zareipour, and Rosehart (2012) analyze a SFE
with linear supply functions and find that although the intermittency of wind power tends to increase
the market price, the net impact of wind power is a lower market price. In this paper we also treat
variable generation as price-takers and study its impact on both average price and price volatility.
We further consider the impact of dispatch policies (priority dispatch vs. economic curtailment) on
SFE and market prices.
The role of economic curtailment policy has been investigated in several studies. Ela (2009)
explores the network effects of economic curtailment. Ela and Edelson (2012) analyze the benefit
of curtailment on relieving physical constraints of generation resources, thereby bringing substantial
cost savings. Wu and Kapuscinski (2013) analyze the impact of economic curtailment on cycling
cost and peaking cost, and find that curtailing wind power can be both economically and environ-
mentally beneficial under certain situations. This paper complements these works by studying the
impact of economic curtailment on market competition. We find an additional benefit of economic
curtailment—economic curtailment intensifies market competition.
3. The System Model
This section lays the foundation for our subsequent analysis. We first describe the generators’
problem in the electricity system and then formulate the system operator’s problem. Our model is a
combination of Nash game and Stackelberg game: The generators bid simultaneously in a Nash game,
and the system operator follows with an optimal dispatch decision. The generators’ competition is
based on the response of the system operator, and hence they are also the Stackelberg leaders.
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3.1 Generator Types and Costs
The length of the operating horizon is denoted as T , which in practice can be several hours to
one day. To approximate a fleet of power generators, we assume that the system consists of three
types of generators: inflexible, flexible, and variable generators. We assume that each firm owns one
generator, thus we use “firm” and “generator” interchangeably throughout the paper.
Inflexible generators (IG), indexed by i ∈ GI , cannot adjust their output rates during [0, T ]. The
output rate of generator i ∈ GI , denoted as qi ≥ 0, is determined in the system operator’s problem
prior to t = 0 and stays constant over [0, T ]. Let Ĉi(qi) denote generator i’s operating cost per unit
of time. Flexible generators (FG), indexed by j ∈ GF , can adjust their output rates instantaneously.
Let qjt ≥ 0 denote the output rate of generator j ∈ GF at time t ∈ [0, T ], and let Ĉj(qjt) denote
its operating cost rate at time t. For the purpose of the analysis in this paper, we assume IGs’ and
FGs’ capacities are not binding constraints.
Variable generators (VG) have time-varying potential outputs, which depend on factors such as
wind speed or solar radiation. Let K denote the total installed VG capacity, and Wt ∈ [0,K] denote
the potential output of VGs at time t ∈ [0, T ]. VGs may adjust their actual output below Wt, known
as curtailment, for the reasons described below in §3.3. Curtailment can be achieved by pitching the
blades of wind power generators or rotating solar panels to reduce power output.
The costs of the generators satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (i) For any generator k ∈ GI ∪GF , the cost rate function Ĉk(q) is convex, strictly
increasing, and continuously differentiable in q, and Ĉk(0) = 0; (ii) VGs produce energy at negligible
operating cost and receive a subsidy of r ≥ 0 per unit of output that is not curtailed; (iii) FGs and
VGs output can be adjusted instantaneously at negligible cost.
The convexity and monotonicity assumption in part (i) approximates the reality well. Part (ii)
states that VGs receive production-based subsidy and implies that the marginal cost of VGs is −r.
Part (iii) means that FGs are fully flexible in adjusting their output levels and VG curtailment
involves negligible operating cost.
Let Lt ∈ [L,L] denote the price-insensitive load at time t ∈ [0, T ], where 0 ≤ L < L. The load
Lt must be satisfied instantaneously for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The load Lt and the VG potential output Wt
are two sources of uncertainties in our model and they can be correlated.
3.2 Supply Offers and Stated Costs
Prior to t = 0, IGs and FGs simultaneously submit supply functions to the system operator. Gen-
erator k ∈ GI ∪GF submits a supply function Sk(p), which specifies the output rate it is willing to
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produce when the price is p (p ∈ ℜ, the set of real numbers). The supply functions are used by the
system operator to calculate the generators’ stated cost functions, which will be defined in (1) below.
The supply functions are valid for the entire operating horizon [0, T ]. In the PJM market, for
example, each generator submits one supply function for each operating day (see generator offer data
at http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/energy/real-time/historical-bid-data.aspx). In the
MISO market, although generators are allowed to submit hourly offers, most generators submit the
same supply functions for the entire day. (Using MISO’s historical generator offer data available
at https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/MarketReports, we find that about 90% of the generators
submit the same supply offers for the entire day.)
The supply functions satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 2 For any k ∈ GI ∪GF : (i) There exists pmink ≥ 0, such that Sk(p) = 0 for p ≤ pmink ;
(ii) Sk(p) strictly increases in p for p ≥ pmink ; (iii) limp→0Sk(p) = 0.
Assumption 2(i) implies that no generator is willing to produce when the price is too low. Part
(ii) is consistent with practice, e.g., MISO’s Business Practice Manual states that the price-quantity
pairs that form a supply function must be (weakly) increasing for price and strictly increasing for
quantity (MISO, 2013, p. 92). Part (iii) is automatically satisfied if pmink > 0 due to part (i); when
pmink = 0, part (iii) states that no generator is willing to produce when the price drops to nearly zero.
All these assumptions are mild. The commonly used affine supply function Sk(p) = βk(p − pmink )+,
where βk > 0, satisfies Assumption 2. (Throughout the paper, x
+ = max{x, 0} for any x ∈ ℜ.)
Based on the submitted supply function Sk(p), the system operator computes the stated cost
function of generator k as follows (we use “
def






S−1k (x)dx, ∀ k ∈ GI ∪GF , (1)
where S−1k (q)
def
= inf{p : Sk(p) > q} is the inverse supply function. The definition in (1) is commonly
used in practice by the system operators.
Unlike IGs and FGs, VGs are unable to guarantee an output rate because of their inherent
intermittency. Thus, we assume each VG submits a price offer for its potential output. To focus on
analyzing the strategic interactions between IGs and FGs, we assume that an individual VG’s output
does not influence the market price. Therefore, VGs will offer a price equal to their marginal cost
−r (see Assumption 1(ii)). This means that VGs’ stated cost at output rate q is −rq, and that VGs
will produce the potential outputWt when the price exceeds −r, completely curtail output when the
price drops below −r, and are willing to produce at any rate in [0,Wt] when the price is −r.
8
3.3 System Operator’s Problem
The objective of the system operator is to minimize the total expected stated cost of serving the
load over [0, T ]. This objective is consistent with the practice (see, e.g., MISO, 2013, Attachment B,
§4.1.5) and the literature (see, e.g., Anderson and Philpott 2002). The system operator determines
IGs’ output rates prior to t = 0, which will be fixed during [0, T ]. In real time when the load and
VG potential output are realized, the system operator dispatches FGs and VGs and computes the
market price.
The system operator’s problem can be formulated as first deciding the aggregate output rate for
each type of generators and then allocating the aggregate output to individual generators. Let qI ,
qFt , and q
V
t denote the aggregate output rate at time t for IGs, FGs, and VGs, respectively. The
allocation of qVt to VGs has no effect on the stated cost −rqVt . The allocations of qI and qFt are


























The following lemma summarizes the properties of CI(q) and CF (q) and their relationship with













The proofs for the lemma and all other technical results are included in the appendix.
Lemma 1 The total stated cost functions CI(q) and CF (q) are continuously differentiable, convex,




(q) and (CF )
′
(q) = (SF )
−1
(q).
Lemma 1 confirms that the aggregate supply functions in (4) are consistent with the inverse
marginal stated cost functions.
In an electricity system, the total generation and the load should be balanced at any time.
Imbalance leads to extra operating cost. For example, in the case of oversupply, the system operator
must take mitigating actions, such as providing monetary incentives for some consumers to increase
the load, reducing generation to an emergency minimum level, or even shutting down some IGs at
significant wear-and-tear costs. We model the extra costs for handling oversupply situations using a
penalty function h(e), which represents the extra cost rate when the total output exceeds the load
by e ≥ 0. A similar approach is used in practice. For example, in the Texas electricity system,
a penalty for violating the power balance constraint is included in the objective function of the
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security-constrained economic dispatch problem (ERCOT 2012, p. 24).
Assumption 3 The oversupply penalty rate function h(e) is strictly convex, strictly increasing, and
continuously differentiable in e for e ≥ 0, and h(0) = 0.
Our model does not involve undersupply, because FGs are flexible enough to ensure that all
demand is met. Using the aggregate outputs qI , qFt , and q
V
t as decision variables, the system
operator’s problem of minimizing the total expected stated cost can be written as









s.t. et ≡ qI + qFt + qVt − Lt ≥ 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], (6)
qVt ≤Wt, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], (7)
qI , qFt , q
V
t ≥ 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. (8)
Note that this optimization problem contains two stochastic processes: the load process {Lt; 0 ≤
t ≤ T} and the VG potential output {Wt; 0 ≤ t ≤ T}. The two processes can be correlated and
we assume that their (joint) probability distribution is known to all firms (Lt is usually much more
predictable than Wt). The expectation is taken with respect to these two processes. The decision
qI is made before time 0, while qFt and q
V
t are determined at time t when Lt and Wt are realized.
The inequality in (6) ensures sufficient supply to meet the load, whereas excess supply (if et > 0) is
penalized in the objective (5).
4. Optimal Dispatch and Market Mechanism
The system operator acts as a Stackelberg game follower, who solves the problem in (5)-(8) after the
generators submit their supply functions. To solve (5)-(8), we first fix IGs’ output rate qI and solve
for the optimal qFt and q
V
t in response to the realizations of Lt and Wt. Then we decide the optimal
qI prior to t = 0. These two steps are analyzed in §4.1 and §4.2, respectively.
4.1 Optimal Flexible and Variable Generation for Given qI
Suppose the IG output rate qI ≥ 0 is given. At time t, knowing the realized load Lt and VG potential







CF (qFt )− r qVt + h(et) (9)
s.t. et ≡ qI + qFt + qVt − Lt ≥ 0, (10)
qVt ≤Wt, qFt , qVt ≥ 0. (11)
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The following theorem provides an explicit solution to the problem in (9)-(11).
Theorem 1 For a given IG output rate qI ≥ 0, under the realized VG potential output Wt and the
load Lt, the optimal FG and VG production rates at time t are
qF∗t = (Lt − qI −Wt)+ and qV ∗t = min
{





= (h′)−1(r) = inf{q ≥ 0 : h′(q) > r}. Furthermore, the induced real-time cost rate
C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) in (9) is jointly convex in (q
I , Lt,Wt).
Figure 1: Real-Time Operating Policy and Price
No use Partial use Full use Full useOptimal use 
of VG capacity: 
Optimal FG output:
Real-time price:
A1 : Lt − qI ≤ −µ(r) A3 : Lt − qI ∈ [Wt − µ(r), Wt]
A2 : Lt − qI ∈ (−µ(r), Wt − µ(r)) A4 : Lt − qI > Wt
The optimal solutions in (12) under various realized values of Lt andWt are illustrated in Figure 1.
If the load Lt drops below the IG output q
I to such an extent that the marginal oversupply penalty
exceeds the per-unit subsidy, h′(qI − Lt) ≥ r (i.e., qI − Lt ≥ µ(r) or event A1), then the VG output
does not bring net benefit to the system and is completely curtailed. When r > h′(qI −Lt), some or
all of the VG potential output is used, corresponding to the next three cases.
In event A2, VG output is partially curtailed such that the per-unit subsidy equals the marginal
oversupply penalty, r = h′(et) or µ(r) = et = q
I + qV ∗t − Lt. In event A3, the per-unit subsidy
outweighs the marginal oversupply penalty when all VG potential output is used, r ≥ h′(qI+Wt−Lt),
and thus, no curtailment occurs. In event A4, IGs and VGs cannot meet the entire load, and FGs
serve the remaining load.
The four events imply that FGs produce if and only if the load cannot be satisfied by IGs and
11






That is, when FGs produce, VGs’ potential output is fully used. When VG curtailment occurs, FGs
do not produce.
Figure 1 also shows the price, pt, which equals the system’s marginal cost, i.e., the cost of
serving an additional unit of load at time t. When the load exceeds the combined output of IGs




(Lt −Wt − qI) > 0. Using Lemma 1, we can also write pt = (SF )−1(Lt −Wt − qI).
When the load can be met by IGs and VGs, the price becomes zero or negative:
a) The price is zero when VG output is partially curtailed (event A2 occurs) and no subsidy is
provided (r = 0). An additional unit of load can be served by VGs at zero cost.
b) The price is negative when the additional load lowers the total stated cost by either reducing
the oversupply penalty or increasing VG output (when r > 0). In event A1, all VG output
is curtailed, oversupply is qI − Lt, and price is pt = −h′(qI − Lt) < −r. In event A2, VG is
partially curtailed and pt = −r. In event A3, pt = −h′(qI +Wt − Lt) ∈ (−r, 0).
Summarizing the above discussion, we can express the price pt as a function of q
I , Lt, and Wt by
(14) below. In this expression, the dependence on supply function SF (·) is also emphasized.





(Lt−Wt− qI)1A4 − h′(qI+Wt− Lt)1A3 − r1A2 − h′(qI− Lt)1A1 , (14)
where 1Ai is the indicator function for event Ai. Clearly, for given q
I , the price does not depend on
IGs’ supply function SI(·).
Using (14), the time-average of the expected price can be written as













where the expectation is taken prior to t = 0. The function P (qI , SF ) relates the average price to
the IG output qI for given FG supply function, thus P (qI , SF ) can be interpreted as IGs’ inverse
residual demand function. Note that P (qI , SF ) decreases in qI , because P (qI , Lt,Wt, S
F ) in (14)
decreases in qI due to the monotonicity of SF (·) and h′(·).
4.2 Optimal Inflexible Generation
With the average price P (qI , SF ) computed in (15), the aggregate (constant) output rate IGs are
willing to set over [0, T ] is SI
(
P (qI , SF )
)
. The system operator needs to ensure consistency between
what IGs are asked to produce and what they are willing to produce: qI = SI
(




this constraint, however, may prevent the system from achieving the optimal qI∗ that minimizes the
total system cost. A significant result in Theorem 2 below shows that the optimal qI∗ satisfies this
constraint.







C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) dt
]
. (16)
From Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, CI(qI) and C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) are convex in q
I , which implies that the
objective function in (16) is convex in qI .
Theorem 2 The optimal IG output qI∗ satisfies
qI∗ = SI
(
P (qI∗, SF )
)
. (17)
Furthermore, the price function in (14) can be expressed as
P (qI , Lt,Wt;S
F ) = inf
{
p : SF (p) +Wt1{p≥−r} − µ(−p) ≥ Lt − qI
}
. (18)
Equation (18) provides a supply-function based method for calculating the price originally defined
in (14). In (18), SF (p) is FGs’ supply function, Wt1{p≥−r} is VGs’ supply function (VGs offer the
entire potential output whenever the price is at least −r), and the oversupply function µ(−p) gives
the oversupply level when the price is p < 0.
Theorem 2 confirms that the relation qI = SI
(
P (qI , SF )
)
must hold at optimality. Equation (17)
can also be written as (SI)
−1
(qI∗) = P (qI∗, SF ), which means that qI∗ is the intersection of the IGs’
inverse supply function (SI)
−1
(qI) and the IGs’ inverse residual demand function P (qI , SF ). These
Figure 2: Optimal IG Production qI∗
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two functions are depicted as the solid curves in Figure 2.
How does the optimal IG production qI∗ vary with the supply functions? When IGs bid more
competitively by increasing their supply function to ŜI(p) or decreasing their inverse supply function
to (ŜI)
−1
(qI) shown as a dashed curve in Figure 2, qI∗ rises to q̂I∗, i.e., IGs’ market share increases.
When FGs bid more competitively by increasing their supply function to S̃F (p), the price decreases
according to (18), and the average price decreases to P (qI , S̃F ), as shown in Figure 2. Consequently,
qI∗ decreases to q̃I∗. In both cases, more competitive supply offers lead to a lower average price.
4.3 The Market Mechanism
Theorems 1 and 2 solve the system operator’s problem of deciding the optimal production to minimize
the expected total stated cost. We now summarize the market mechanism based on the above results.
1) Prior to t = 0, IGs and FGs simultaneously submit supply functions {Si(p) : i ∈ GI} and
{Sj(p) : j ∈ GF }, and VGs offer price −r (assumed in §3.2).
2) Prior to t = 0, the system operator determines the IG output rate using the following steps:









(ii) Compute the price as a function of the IG output qI , load L, and VG potential output W :
P (qI , L,W, SF ) = inf
{
p : SF (p) +W1{p≥−r} − µ(−p) ≥ L− qI
}
, or
P (qI , L,W, SF ) = (SF )
−1
(L−W − qI)1A4 − h′(qI +W − L)1A3 − r1A2 − h′(qI − L)1A1 .
(iii) Determine the IG output rate qI∗ by solving
(SI)
−1










3) Production and payment:
(i) IG i ∈ GI produces Si(P (qI∗, SF )) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) At time t ∈ [0, T ], the price is pt ≡ P (qI∗, Lt,Wt, SF ), and FG j ∈ GF produces Sj(pt).
(iii) VGs produce Wt if pt > −r, produce Lt − qI + µ(r) if pt = −r, and do not produce if
pt < −r.
(iv) All generators are paid pt per unit of output at time t.
The above mechanism is common knowledge to all generators. With the knowledge of the system
operator’s dispatch and market mechanism, the IGs and FGs compete in a Nash game through
supply functions, analyzed in the next section.
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5. Linear Supply Function Competition
In the classic supply function equilibria (SFE) model, in a firm’s best response problem, the firm
optimizes its profit with respect to its residual demand function. Because the optimality condition
involves the derivatives of competitors’ supply functions, a SFE is characterized by a system of
differential equations (Klemperer and Meyer 1989). The differential equation approach is analytically
challenging, especially when firms are asymmetric. Thus, SFE with linear supply functions are
considered in the classic works by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Rudkevich (1999), among others;
see Baldick et al. (2004) for a summary of the advantages of linear SFE. Green (1996, 1999) and
Baldick et al. (2004) use linear SFE to derive economic insights and policy implications.
One of our goals in this paper is to examine how firms’ (in)flexibility affects SFE and compare
our results and insights with the classic works. This comparison is made possible by focusing on
solving for linear SFE and comparing the slopes of the equilibrium supply functions in our model
with those in the classic models. Solving for the general SFE with asymmetric firms is difficult in the
classic setting, and even more difficulty in our setting where generators not only have asymmetric
cost but also different flexibility levels.
From this point onward, we assume each generator’s production cost rate is quadratic in its





2, k ∈ GI ∪CF , ck > 0, q ≥ 0, (20)
which implies a linear marginal cost C ′k(q) = ckq. Hence, in a perfectly competitive market, generator
k would submit the inverse marginal cost as its supply function, i.e., Sk(p) = c
−1
k p
+. In an imperfect
competition, we assume generators submit linear supply functions:
Sk(p) = βkp
+, k ∈ GI ∪ CF , βk > 0, p ∈ ℜ. (21)
That is, when the price is positive, the output rate that a generator is willing to produce is linear in
price. The generator’s pure strategy set will be defined in §5.2.





2, ah ≥ 0, ch > 0, e ≥ 0, (22)
which gives µ(r) = (h′)−1(r) = (r − ah)+/ch.
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5.1 Optimal Dispatch under Given Supply Functions
For given qI > 0, Theorem 1 gives the optimal qF∗t and q
V ∗
t as functions of q
I . The results on the
optimal qI∗ in Theorem 2 are specialized below. The aggregate IG and FG supply functions are










βj . With linear supply functions, we can express the price
functions P (qI , Lt,Wt, S
F ) and P (qI , SF ) in (14)-(15) as functions of βF , written as follows:




(Lt −Wt − qI)1A4 −
[
ah + ch(q





















In most of the practical situations, the system operator instructs IGs to produce a positive
output and the average market price is also positive. Thus, we assume the optimal qI∗ > 0. Then,
equation (17) that determines qI∗ can be written as
qI = βIP (qI , βF ). (25)
There is a unique qI∗ satisfying (25). We denote this unique qI∗ as a function of βI and βF :
qI∗ ≡ QI(βI , βF ) def=
{
qI : qI = βIP (qI , βF )
}
. (26)
Lemma 2 The optimal IG output rate QI(βI , βF ) strictly increases in βI and strictly decreases in
βF .
The monotonicity of QI(βI , βF ) is intuitively illustrated in Figure 2 and formally stated in
Lemma 2.
5.2 Pure Strategy Set
In the linear supply function competition, the supply function slopes, βk, k ∈ GI ∪CF , are strategic
variables. This section establishes the bounds on βk. These bounds form a compact and convex pure
strategy set, which is used to establish the existence of the equilibrium in §5.5.
For generator k’s supply function Sk(p) = βkp
+, a larger βk implies a more competitive supply
offer. The discussion preceding (21) reveals that an upper bound for βk is c
−1
k < ∞, which is what
generator k would offer in face of perfect competition.
For FG j ∈ GF , a lower bound on βj can be found by solving a less competitive game in which IGs
do not exist. For IG i ∈ GI , a lower bound on βi can be obtained by considering a less competitive
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game in which FGs do not exist and the demand is constant over [0, T ], but its level is uncertain prior
to t = 0. These games are essentially the standard supply function games considered by Klemperer
and Meyer (1989). Rudkevich (1999) studies the linear SFE for these games and shows that the slopes
of the equilibrium supply functions are strictly positive and independent of the demand distribution.
Hence, βk is bounded from below by a strictly positive number, denoted as β
min
k > 0, which is
independent of the distribution of the uncertainties.
Using the upper and lower bounds, we define the pure strategy set of generator k as [βmink , c
−1
k ].
The slopes of the aggregate IG and FG supply functions are also bounded: βI ∈ [βI min, βI max] and

















Using Lemma 2, we can establish bounds on qI as
qImin = QI(βI min, βF max) and qImax = QI(βI max, βF min). (27)
In deriving (25), we assumed qI∗ > 0. A sufficient condition for qI∗ > 0 is P (0, βF max) > 0,
i.e., the average price is positive when IGs do not produce and FGs bid perfectly competitively,
which is a mild condition. To see the sufficiency, note that qI min in (27) is the unique solution to
qI = βI min P (qI , βF max). Thus, P (0, βF max) > 0 implies qImin > 0, which ensures qI∗ > 0.
5.3 Individual IG and FG’s Problem
We now formulate how an individual IG i ∈ GI chooses βi in response to all other generators’ supply
functions. Given an average price P > 0, generator i will produce at a rate Si(P ) = βiP throughout
[0, T ], incurring a cost rate of 12ci(βiP )
2. Thus, the profit rate is βiP







Note that P depends on qI and βF through (24), and qI is affected by βi through (25). Hence, IG









P (qI , βF )2 (28)
s.t. (25) and βi ∈ [βmini , c−1i ].
This formulation is similar to the bi-level optimization procedure by Hobbs et al. (2000). The
system-level optimization yields (25) and the firm-level objective is given by (28).
Using (25) and (26), we can write the price function as

























The best response of IG i to β−i and β






An individual FG j ∈ GF chooses βj in response to all other generator’s supply functions.
Observing price pt at time t, generator j produces at a rate βjp
+




















2. Note that pt = P (q
I , Lt,Wt, β
F )

















s.t. (25) and βj ∈ [βminj , c−1j ].
Equations (23) and (26) lead to













= βF − βj and rewrite the objective in (30) as a function of the strategic variables:













Lt −Wt −QI(βI , βj + β−j)
)+)2]
dt. (31)
Then, FG j’s best response to β−j and β




πj(βj ;β−j , β
I).
5.4 Interactions Between IGs and FGs
The profit functions in (29) and (31) provide important insights on how IGs and FGs compete:
• IGs and FGs interact only through the function QI(βI , βF ), which is IGs’ market share. This
interaction implies that the competition between IGs and FGs is over the market share.
• The variabilities in load and VG potential output play no (direct) role in IGs’ profit function
(29). Thus, IGs do not directly compete with FGs in meeting the variable demand. On the
other hand, the variabilities in Lt and Wt directly affect FGs’ profit function in (31). Hence, FGs
compete among themselves to serve the variable demand.
We will use these insights to explain some of the equilibrium behaviors observed in the numerical
analysis in §6.
The strategic interaction between IGs and FGs also renders the best responses dependent on the
distribution of the uncertainties. Without this strategic interaction, QI(βI , βF ) would be constant
and, consequently, the distributions of Lt and Wt would not affect FG j’s best response determined
by (31). With the FG-IG interaction through QI(βI , βF ), the distributions of Lt and Wt affect the
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optimal choice of βj in (31), which in turn affects the strategic decisions of all other generators. This
feature is in contrast with the classic SFE model, in which supply function equilibria are found to
be independent of the demand distribution; see, e.g., Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Green (1996),
Holmberg (2007), and Anderson and Hu (2008).
5.5 Existence of Equilibrium under Normally Distributed Uncertainties
Proving the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for the game specified in §§5.2-5.3 presents
analytical challenges. In general, existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium can established by
proving one of the following: a) the best response functions constitute a contraction mapping and
the decision space is compact, b) each player’s payoff function is quasi-concave in its own decision
and the decision space is compact, convex, and independent of other players’ decisions, and c) each
player’s payoff function is supermodular with respect to its own decision and other players’ decisions,
and that the decision space is a lattice. Proving uniqueness usually has to rely on approach a).
As discussed earlier, our model represents a combination of Nash game and Stackelberg game.
Both IGs’ and FGs’ payoff functions (29) and (31) depend on the distribution of uncertainties and
the optimal dispatch in §5.1. Thus the firm-level optimization problem belongs to the class of MPEC
(mathematical program with equilibrium constraints) problems that are highly complex. However,
we are able to use approach b) to prove the existence under the assumption that the load and
VG potential output (when collapsed across time) are jointly normally distributed. We are unable
to establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium, but our extensive numerical results show that the
equilibrium is unique, which we will discuss in §6.
For the process {(Lt,Wt) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, we let fLt,Wt(x, y) be the joint probability density function
of Lt and Wt. Note that load Lt and VG potential output Wt can be cross-sectionally and serially








fLt,Wt(x, y) dt. (32)
It can be verified that fL,W (x, y) is also a probability density function. Let L and W be the random





































That is, the time-average of the expected value of g(Lt,Wt) equals the expected value of g(L,W )
under the time-invariant probability distribution fL,W (x, y) in (32).
From this point onward, we assume fL,W (x, y) is a bivariate normal density function, and L ∼
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N (µL, σ2L) and W ∼ N (µW , σ2W ) with a correlation coefficient ρ. Define the net demand random
variable D
def
= L−W ∼ N (µD, σ2D) where µD = µL−µW , and σ2D = σ2L+σ2W +2ρσLσW . As common
with models using normal distributions to approximate nonnegative random variables, the results in
this section are proven when the variance of the normal distribution is not too large.
Proving quasi-concavity of the profit functions (29) and (31) under general conditions is difficult
due to the complicated structure of the price function in (14), which renders the average price in (15)
neither convex nor concave in qI . However, if the probability of qI < L−W (event A4 in Figure 1)
is sufficiently high, the average price function is approximately linear, which bounds its second-order
derivative with respect to qI and leads to the quasi-concavity of the profit functions. The formal
proof requires a lemma stated below.










, then qI max < µD.
Lemma 3 shows that for a sufficiently small σD, the IG production is bounded above by µD.
Indeed, the IGs’ aggregate output does not exceed the average net demand µD for most situations
in practice. The condition given in Lemma 3 is not stringent. For example, if ah = 0 and β
F min




F min/βI max ≈ 0.25µD. Thus, the condition holds if the standard deviation of the net
demand is within 25% of its mean, which is a mild assumption in most practical situations. Lemma
3 leads to the following equilibrium existence theorem.
Theorem 3 When generators compete using linear supply functions and the standard deviation of
the net demand σD is sufficiently small, there exists a (pure strategy) supply function equilibrium.
In Theorem 3, the upper-bound on σD that ensures the existence of a linear supply function
equilibrium is provided in the proof in the online appendix. Our numerical experiments, however,
show that the equilibrium exists for a wider range of σD and for other forms of load and VG output
distributions.
6. Numerical Study
In this section, we compute SFE based on the model analyzed in §§4-5 and compare our results with
the classic SFE model by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Green (1996). We also analyze the effect
of increasing VG penetration and its dispatch policy (priority dispatch vs. economic curtailment) on
SFE. Our analysis aims to derive qualitative insights and provide policy recommendations.
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6.1 Setups and Computational Procedure
We consider a market consisting of four IGs indexed by i ∈ GI = {1, 2, 3, 4} and four FGs indexed





where q is in MW and ck is measured in $/MWh/MW. To facilitate comparison between IGs’ and





, for i ∈ GI , cj = 1, for j ∈ GF .
The system’s oversupply penalty for e MW of oversupply is assumed to be h(e) = 12che
2 with
ch = 1/3. We report the equilibrium results under the above cost parameters, but we have also
examined other cost parameters with ci < cj , where ci, cj ∈ {1/6, 1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 1, 2, 3}, and
ch ∈ {1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 1, 2}. We find that the qualitative results described in this section are robust
across all problem instances we examined. We remark on the robustness of the results along with
the discussions in the rest of this section.
We next specify the time-invariant probability distribution, fL,W (x, y), defined in (32). Within
a given operating horizon [0, T ], we assume the load and VG potential output follow independent
normal distributions, with µL = 100, σL = 15, µW = 5, and σW = 1.75, measured in MWh per
5 minutes. (Many electricity systems measure load and VG output at 5-minute intervals.) The
length of the horizon T is typically several hours to one day, but because we will report costs and
emissions in hourly rates, the specific value of T does not affect our results.
The VG penetration level is µW/µL = 5%, close to the current VG penetration in the U.S.
In addition to this base case, we also consider various VG penetration levels. Following Wu and
Kapuscinski (2013), when VG penetration increases bym times (µW increases tomµW ), the standard
deviation σW increases to mσW if the existing and added VG outputs are perfectly correlated, or
to
√
mσW if they are independent. The realistic case is likely in between and we assume that σW
increases to m0.75σW . Specifically, we consider five VG penetration levels: 0%, 5%, 15%, 30%, and
50%. That is, m = 0, 1, 3, 6, 10.
We consider the following policies for VGs: priority dispatch for VG (no curtailment), economic
curtailment for VG (when subsidy r = 0), partial economic curtailment for VG (when subsidy r = 20
or 40 $/MWh).
The generators submit linear supply functions Sk(p) = βkp
+, as in (21). The following iterative
procedure is used to compute the generators’ equilibrium supply function slopes:
Step 1. Set n = 0 and choose an initial slope β0k ∈ [βmink , c−1k ] for every generator k ∈ GI ∪GF .
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Step 2. Increase n by 1. For every generator k ∈ GI ∪GF , find βnk ∈ [βmink , c−1k ] that maximizes
generator k’s profit, assuming that none of the other generators modify their slopes (i.e.,
use βn−1l for generator l 6= k).
Step 3. If max
k∈GI∪GF
{ ∣∣βnk − βn−1k
∣∣ /βn−1k
}
< ε, then terminate the procedure and the equilibrium
supply function slopes are {βnk }, otherwise go to Step 2.
In Step 2, we numerically find that the objective function is strictly quasi-concave, which ensures
that any local maximum is the unique global maximum. In Step 3, we use ε = 0.1% for the
convergence criterion. The procedure typically takes only 4 to 5 iterations to converge.
To numerically examine the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we initiate the procedure with many
different starting points in Step 1 and find that the procedure always converges to the same equilib-
rium. Furthermore, when all generators are assumed to be flexible, the procedure produces exactly
the same results as the classic SFE model with linear supply functions.
6.2 FG-IG Equilibrium vs. Klemperer-Meyer Equilibrium
The supply function slope βk is useful for the theoretical analysis in §5, but for the purpose of
describing the insights from our numerical experiments, it is more intuitive to use price offer slope
γk
def
= 1/βk ∈ [ck, 1/βmink ]. A lower γk means a more competitive price offer. In a perfect competition,
generator k’s price offer is equal to its marginal cost ckq.
As our model extends the classic SFE model by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) to include asym-
metries in both cost and flexibility, we first compare the SFE in our model (referred to as FG-IG
equilibrium) with the Klemperer-Meyer model (referred to as KM equilibrium), focusing on the SFE
with linear supply functions.
The KM model ignores the generators’ inflexibility and treats generators 1-4 as if they are flexible
to find the equilibrium supply functions. Following Green (1996) and Rudkevich (1999), we solve
the KM equilibrium with linear supply functions under the same cost functions described in §6.1.
We find that, in the KM model, generators 1-4 each offer price 0.427 q and generators 5-8 each offer
price 1.082 q, shown in Figure 3(a).
Using the procedure in §6.1, we compute the FG-IG equilibrium without VG in the system.
Because our model recognizes the inflexibility of generators 1-4, one might expect IGs 1-4 to behave
more differently than FGs 5-8 compared to the KM equilibrium. However, in the FG-IG equilibrium,
IGs offer price 0.429 q, which is only 0.5% higher than in the KM model, whereas FGs offer price
1.139 q, 5.3% higher than in the KM model. In terms of the markup (γk − ck)q, FGs’ markup is
0.139 q, 69% higher than their markup 0.082 q in the KM model; IGs’ markup is only 2.4% higher
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Figure 3: Klemperer-Meyer Equilibrium vs. FG-IG Equilibrium without VG














































than in the KM model. The price offer slopes under different models are shown in Figure 3(a).
The reasons underlying the difference between the FG-IG and KM equilibria stem from the
reduced competition due to inflexibility. All eight generators are treated as flexible in the KM
model, but only four of them are actually FGs. IGs do not compete with FGs in matching production
with the variable demand; FGs compete among themselves to serve the variable demand (see the
discussion in §5.4). Thus, the competition facing an FG in our model is less intense than that in the
KM model, allowing FGs to raise their price offers significantly above what the KM model predicts.
On the other hand, IGs’ price offers in our equilibrium is similar to that in the KM model, because
an IG faces direct competition from all other generators. In particular, IGs still compete with FGs
for market share (IGs produce qI∗ and FGs serve the rest of the demand). This competition is only
slightly less intense than in the KM model because FGs raise their price offers as explained above. As
a result, IGs slightly raise their price offers above the KM equilibrium. The above finding suggests
that the KM model underestimates generators’ price offers, more significantly so for FGs.
Next, we compare how the two models differ in market price estimation. Estimating the market
price involves two steps: First, estimate the equilibrium supply functions using a SFE model; second,
compute the price statistics under the estimated supply functions. A forecaster who uses the classic
SFE model in the first step may or may not consider inflexibility in the second step. We refer to
the estimates without recognizing inflexibility in either step as “KM est. 1” and the estimates with
inflexibility consideration in only the second step as “KM est. 2”. The FG-IG model recognizes
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inflexibility in both steps. We also compute the price under perfect competition with inflexibility
consideration as a benchmark.
Figure 3(b) shows that the mean and standard deviation of the price estimated by the KM model
(both KM est. 1 and est. 2) are lower than those estimated by the FG-IG model. The KM est. 1 for
the price standard deviation is considerably lower, because ignoring inflexibility in the second step
leads to an incorrect assumption that all generators can mitigate load variability.
Although KM est. 2 considers inflexibility in the second step, it underestimates the average
price and price standard deviation. KM est. 2 for the average price is lower because the KM model
underestimates the equilibrium price offers for both IGs and FGs. KM est. 2 underestimates the price
volatility for two reasons. First, the KM model underestimates FGs’ price offer slopes and, thus, it
underestimates the magnitude of price fluctuations when the price is positive. Second, because the
KM model underestimates the price offers more for FGs, it underestimates IGs’ market share and,
thus, it underestimates the magnitude of the negative prices.
In view of both the generators’ price offers and the equilibrium price, the KM model overestimates
the intensity of the competition in a market with inflexible generators. This result is robust across
all cost parameters we have examined.
6.3 Impact of Variable Generation (under Priority Dispatch) on SFE
Because the KM equilibrium is known to be independent of the distribution of the uncertainties,
variable generation has no impact on the price offers in the KM equilibrium. In Figure 4(a)-(b), the
KM equilibrium price offers are invariant to the VG penetration levels.
In the FG-IG equilibrium, when the VG penetration increases, the overall variability (including
demand and VG output variabilities) increases. If VGs have priority in dispatch, the only lever for
balancing against the increased variability is adjusting the FGs’ output. Increased variability also
increases the chance of oversupply, which makes a lower IG output more desirable for the system.
Both of these reasons give FGs an advantage in the market-share competition with IGs. To profit
from this advantage, FGs raise their price offers as the VG penetration increases, which is confirmed
in Figure 4(a); the top curve is for priority dispatch.
On the other hand, as the VG penetration increases, IGs face a price-quantity tradeoff: They
can either increase price offers to raise the equilibrium price but get a smaller market share, or lower
their price offers to gain more market share. Because a low IG output is desirable for the system to
mitigate the oversupply penalty when VGs have priority, IGs’ strategy of lowering price offers may
not lead to an output increase that is sufficient to raise IGs’ profits. Thus, raising price offers is
preferred by IGs, as confirmed by the top curve in Figure 4(b). Hence, under the priority dispatch
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Figure 4: Effects of VG on the Equilibrium under Priority Dispatch
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policy for VGs, both IGs and FGs raise their price offers as the VG penetration increases, and the
KM model increasingly underestimates generators’ price offers and overestimates the intensity of the
market competition.
Although inflated price offers tend to raise the market price, the increased VG penetration reduces
the average net demand and tends to reduce the price. The equilibrium price is a result of the
combination of these two effects. The second effect dominates in determining the average price, as
shown in Figure 4(c): the average price declines as the VG penetration increases.
Under the priority dispatch policy, increasing VG penetration makes the price more volatile, as
revealed in Figure 4(d). The reasons are twofold. At a high VG penetration level, the VG output
can still occasionally drop to a low level, requiring FGs to ramp up production, which escalates the
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market price due to FGs’ increased price offers. When the VG output surges, however, the system
has to take all the VG output due to its priority, resulting in possibly very negative prices at high
VG penetration levels.
We have examined the above results under various cost parameters. The qualitative trends
discussed in this section are robust.
6.4 Impact of the Economic Curtailment Policy on SFE
The analysis in §6.3 assumes VGs have priority; in this section, we consider the policy that allows
economic curtailment of VGs. We focus on the economic curtailment case under zero subsidy (r = 0)
and compare it with the cases under subsidies r = 20 and 40 $/MWh.
The FG-IG equilibrium price offers are shown in Figure 5(a)-(b). The economic curtailment policy
encourages both IGs and FGs to offer lower (more competitive) prices compared to the priority
dispatch policy. As the VG penetration increases, Figure 5(a) shows that FGs’ price offer slope
increases slower than that under the priority dispatch policy, while Figure 5(b) shows that IGs’ price
offer slope declines and may even drop below the price offer slope predicted by the KM model.
The economic curtailment policy increases the market competition in two ways. First, economic
curtailment provides the system operator with an additional lever to manage uncertainty, and thus,
the system operator allocates less production to FGs than under the priority dispatch policy. As a
result, FGs offer more competitive prices to compete for market share. Second, economic curtailment
significantly reduces the oversupply penalty, thereby altering the price-quantity tradeoff facing IGs
(this tradeoff is described in §6.3). Consequently, IGs’ strategy of lowering price offers can yield an
output increase that is sufficient to increase IGs’ profits. These two effects of the economic curtailment
policy reinforce each other in equilibrium, because IGs reduce their price offers in response to FGs’
reduced price offers and vice versa.
Figure 5 also shows the effect of production-based subsidies. Subsidies effectively grant priority
to VGs to some extent and thus lead to less competitive price offers. The price offers in the cases of
r = 20 and 40 $/MWh lie in between the price offers in the priority dispatch and economic curtailment
cases. For all problem instances we examined, we find that under the economic curtailment policy,
IGs reduce their price offers as VG penetration increases. Under r = 20 or 40 $/MWh, whether IGs
increase or decrease their price offers depends on instances, but they always lie between the priority
dispatch and economic curtailment cases.
Economic curtailment has little effect on the average price, but the impact on price volatility
is significant. Figure 5(c) shows that when the VG penetration level is below 30%, average prices
under various VG policies are indistinguishable. At higher VG penetration levels, the average price
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Figure 5: Effects of Economic Curtailment on the Equilibrium
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under economic curtailment is slightly higher because the curtailment reduces the severity of the
negative prices. In contrast, the standard deviation of the price drops considerably under economic
curtailment, as shown in Figure 5(d), because economic curtailment reduces extreme prices by making
the market more competitive when prices are high and reducing the oversupply penalty when prices
are negative.
6.5 Effects of Economic Curtailment on Efficiency and Emission
In this last section, we study the efficiency and emission impact of economic curtailment. The system
efficiency is measured by its average operating cost, which is the sum of the actual production cost
(not the stated cost) of the eight generators and the oversupply penalty. Table 1 shows the system
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operating cost under various VG penetration levels and dispatch policies. On average, one MWh of
economic curtailment reduces the system operating cost by about $30. This cost reduction effect is
consistent across all VG penetration levels. This finding is also in line with the economic benefit of
curtailment found by Wu and Kapuscinski (2013).
Table 1 also reveals that higher subsidies reduce the amount of curtailment but increase the system
operating cost. Interestingly, higher subsidies also increase the cost saving per MWh of curtailment.
For example, at 5% VG penetration with r = 20 $/MWh, one MWh of economic curtailment reduces
the system operating cost by $49; with r = 40 $/MWh, the cost saving per MWh of curtailment
increases to $67. This result is again consistent across all VG penetration levels. The implication is
that the benefit of economic curtailment may be very high in countries and regions where VGs are
heavily subsidized based on the amount of production.
An environmental benefit from increasing VG penetration is the reduced CO2 emission due to





5% 15% 30% 50%
VG penetration
(after curtailment)
r = 40 4.97% 14.91% 29.73% 49.10%
r = 20 4.93% 14.79% 29.42% 48.34%
Economic Curtailment 4.84% 14.53% 28.85% 46.99%
System operating cost
(thousand $/hour)
Priority Dispatch 44.85 36.96 27.04 17.31
r = 40 44.83 36.89 26.82 16.57
r = 20 44.81 36.84 26.70 16.29
Economic Curtailment 44.79 36.80 26.61 16.11
System cost saving per
MWh of curtailment
($/MWh)
r = 40 67.1 65.0 66.8 69.3
r = 20 48.9 47.0 48.8 51.3




Priority Dispatch 1287.8 1044.7 729.9 403.1
r = 40 1288.4 1045.9 733.4 411.2
r = 20 1289.2 1047.7 737.4 418.5




Priority Dispatch 171.6 146.4 116.3 86.9
r = 40 171.3 145.9 114.7 82.8
r = 20 170.9 145.1 112.9 79.3
Economic Curtailment 170.4 143.4 109.5 73.2
Emission rates: 215 lb. of CO2 per mmBtu of coal, 117 lb. of CO2 per mmBtu of natural gas, no emission
for nuclear power generators. Fuel price: $2.5 per mmBtu of coal and $5 per mmBtu of natural gas.
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the displacement of the conventional production by the clean VG production. Table 1 confirms that
the total CO2 emission significantly decreases as the VG penetration increases.
The impact of economic curtailment on CO2 emission, however, is not as obvious and depends
on the generators’ fuel types. Because economic curtailment allows for more IG production and less
FG production, if IGs have a higher (lower) CO2 emission rate than FGs, economic curtailment may
increase (decrease) total CO2 emission. Table 1 demonstrates that when IGs are coal-fired generators
and FGs are natural gas combustion turbines, economic curtailment increases CO2 emission, but
when IGs are nuclear power generators, economic curtailment reduces the emission.
7. Conclusion
Electricity markets have been gradually evolving toward deregulated structures that intend to encour-
age competition and improve efficiency. The research in deregulated electricity markets, especially
the supply function competition, has provided considerable insights into generators’ bidding behavior
and market power. This paper provides new results that address how the competition is affected
by generators’ (in)flexibility and variable generation. The two most important messages from this
paper are that inflexibility contributes to the market power and that the economic curtailment of
variable generation increases the market competition and system efficiency.
Inflexibility contributes to the market power in the following way. Inflexible generators do not
compete with flexible generators in matching production with uncertain demand, leading to increased
market power for flexible generators, which in turn results in higher average price and price volatility
than predicted by the classic SFE model.
Variable generation, when given priority in dispatch, exacerbates the effect of inflexibility on mar-
ket competition, but the economic curtailment policy can intensify the market competition because
economic curtailment serves as a partial substitute for flexible generators to balance against vari-
ability. Furthermore, economic curtailment improves system efficiency by reducing the oversupply
penalty and using more inflexible generation which is less costly than flexible generation.
The insights from this paper also provide several recommendations for the regulators and policy
makers. First, in assessing the competitiveness of the electricity market, it is important to incorporate
generators’ flexibility/inflexibility. Flexible generators compete in balancing against variability and
often set the market price. Encouraging the development of more flexible generators (e.g., fueled by
natural gas) enhances the overall competitiveness of the electricity market. Second, in assessing the
benefit of the economic curtailment policy, it is important to recognize that economic curtailment
helps increase market competition and reduce price volatility. Policy makers need to revisit the
policy of giving priority to variable generation from renewable sources, and consider a full range of
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benefits of economic curtailment. Other benefits of economic curtailment include reduced cycling
cost and peaking cost (Wu and Kapuscinski 2013) and improved production allocation in a network
(Ela 2009). Third, policy makers need to reconsider the design of incentives aimed to maximize
the benefits of renewable energy. The design of subsidies should facilitate economic curtailment
and avoid unintended consequences. Investment in research and development can push technology
advancement that makes renewable energy generation more competitive in the future even without
subsidies.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The inverse supply function is defined as S−1k (q) = inf{p : Sk(p) > q}. Under




k (q) is continuous and increasing in q for q ≥ 0.




S−1k (x)dx is continuously
differentiable, convex, and strictly increasing in q for q ≥ 0.
Consider the optimal allocation problem in (3), rewritten below
CF (q) = min
{ ∑
j∈GF






For any q > 0, the objective in (A.1) is convex on a closed convex set
{
(q, qj, j ∈ GF ) : q ∈ [0, q],





. Hence, the theorem on convexity preservation under minimization (Heyman
and Sobel 1984, p. 525) implies that CF (q) is convex in q.
For a given q > 0, let {q∗j } be the minimizer for (A.1). We show {q∗j } has two properties:
1) If q∗j , q
∗
















k), we can strictly
reduce the objective by increasing q∗j by ε and reducing q
∗
k by ε, where ε > 0 is small.
2) If q∗j = 0 and q
∗
k > 0, then C
′
j(0) ≥ C ′k(q∗k). To see this, if C ′j(0) < C ′k(q∗k), we can strictly
reduce the objective by setting q∗j = ε and reducing q
∗
k by ε, where ε > 0 is small.
Denote p ≡ C ′j(q∗j ) for q∗j > 0. Note that p > 0 because Cj(qj) is convex and strictly increasing
in qj for qj ≥ 0. Define GF+ =
{
j ∈ GF : C ′j(q∗j ) = p
}






j ). For j 6∈ GF+, we
have q∗j = 0 and C
′
j(0) > p. Then, for sufficiently small ε > 0, we have






j + εj), (A.2)




εj = ε. Using Taylor series, (A.2) can be written as











j ) + o(εj)
]
= CF (q) + εp + o(ε),
where o(x) is a function g(x) satisfying g(x)/x → 0 as x→ 0. Similarly, we can show that CF (q)−
CF (q − ε) = εp + o(ε). Hence, CF (q) is differentiable with derivative (CF )′(q) = p > 0.
Finally, we show p = (SF )
−1
(q). For j ∈ GF+, we have p = C ′j(q∗j ) = S−1j (q∗j ) or Sj(p) =
q∗j . For j 6∈ GF+, we have C ′j(0) > p, which implies S−1j (0) = pminj > p, which in turn leads to
Sj(p) = 0 = q
∗







q∗j = q, which leads to
p = (SF )
−1
(q). Because SF (p) also satisfies Assumption 2, (SF )
−1
(q) is continuous in q. Therefore,
CF (q) is continuously differentiable and (CF )
′
(q) = (SF )
−1
(q).
Similar results can be shown for IGs’ problem in (2), which completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove that (12) is optimal in the case of Lt − qI −Wt ≥ 0. In
this case, constraints (10)-(11) imply that qFt ≥ Lt − qI −Wt ≥ 0. If we set qFt at the lower bound
Lt − qI −Wt, then qVt =Wt and et = 0, which clearly minimize the objective in (9).
When Lt − qI −Wt < 0, we have qF∗t = 0 because: (i) if qFt > 0 and et > 0, then a lower qFt
reduces the objective in (9); (ii) if qFt > 0 and et = 0, then q
V
t = Lt − qI − qFt < Wt, and we can
reduce qFt and increase q
V
t to lower the objective in (9). Hence, q
F∗





− r qVt + h(qI + qVt − Lt) : 0 ≤ qVt ≤Wt
}
,
where we set h(e) = 0 for e < 0. An interior optimal solution satisfies h′(qI + qV ∗t − Lt) = r, or
qV ∗t = Lt − qI + µ(r), which is indeed optimal if 0 < Lt − qI + µ(r) < Wt. If Lt − qI + µ(r) ≥ Wt,
then qV ∗t =Wt. If Lt − qI + µ(r) < 0, then qV ∗t = 0. This proves that (12) is optimal.
For any q > L, the objective function in (9) is convex on a closed convex set {(qI , Lt,Wt, qFt , qVt ) :
qI ∈ [0, q], Lt ∈ [L,L], Wt ∈ [0,K], qFt ∈ [0, q], (10), and (11)}. By the theorem on convexity
preservation under minimization (Heyman and Sobel 1984, p. 525), we conclude that C̃(qI , Lt,Wt)
is jointly convex in (qI , Lt,Wt).




, which is useful for deriving
the first-order condition for (16). Using Theorem 1, we can write
C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) = C
F (qF∗t )− r qV ∗t + h(qI + qF∗t + qV ∗t − Lt),
where qF∗t and q
V ∗
t are given in Figure 1 under the four events. The indicators of these events can
be written as
1A1 = 1Lt≤qI−µ(r),
1A2 = −1Lt≤qI−µ(r) + 1Lt<qI+Wt−µ(r),
1A3 = −1Lt<qI+Wt−µ(r) + 1Lt≤qI+Wt ,
1A4 = 1Lt>qI+Wt .
(A.3)
We denote C̃Ai(·, ·, ·) = C̃(·, ·, ·) when Ai occurs. Then, using the optimal policy in Figure 1, we have
C̃A1(q
I , Lt,Wt) = h(q
I − Lt),
C̃A2(q
I , Lt,Wt) = −r (Lt − qI+ µ(r)) + h(µ(r)),
C̃A3(q
I , Lt,Wt) = −rWt + h(qI+Wt − Lt),
C̃A4(q
I , Lt,Wt) = C
F (Lt − qI−Wt)− rWt.
(A.4)







































It can be verified that C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) is differentiable in q
I except at qI = Lt −Wt, where the





is differentiable in qI everywhere. Next, we compute its derivative.
The first three expectations in (A.5) all have the form of E
[
g(qI , Lt,Wt)1Lt≤b(qI ,Wt)
]
, for some
functions g(qI , Lt,Wt) and b(q
I ,Wt). Let the joint probability density function of Lt and Wt be



































The last expectation in (A.5) is in the form of E
[
g(qI , Lt,Wt)1Lt>b(qI ,Wt)
]



































Now, applying (A.6)-(A.7) to the derivatives of the expectations in (A.5), we find that the integral
term g
(
















































− P (qI , Lt,Wt, SF )
]
,
where the last equality follows from Lemma 1 and the definition in (14).
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which is equivalent to (CI)
′
(qI∗) = P (qI∗, SF ). Applying Lemma 1, we have qI∗ = SI
(
P (qI∗, SF )
)
.
If qI∗ = 0, then (CI)
′
(0) ≥ P (0, SF ). Because SI(p) = 0 for any p ≤ (CI)′(0), we have
SI
(
P (0, SF )
)
= 0. Thus, qI∗ = SI
(
P (qI∗, SF )
)
holds for qI∗ = 0. This proves equation (17).
Finally, we show P (qI , Lt,Wt, S
F ) has the alternative expression in (18). We verify this by
considering separate regions. The inequality in (18) is
SF (p) +Wt1{p≥−r} − µ(−p) ≥ Lt − qI . (A.8)
In region A1, Lt − qI ≤ −µ(r), and (A.8) clearly holds if p = po ≡ −h′(qI − Lt). Note that
po ≤ −r. Thus, for any other price p1 < po, the left side of (A.8) becomes −µ(−p1), which is strictly
less than Lt − qI . Hence, po is the minimum price for (A.8) to hold.
In region A2, Lt−qI ∈ (−µ(r), Wt−µ(r)). If p = −r, then (A.8) holds becauseWt−µ(r) > Lt−qI .
For any other p1 < −r, (A.8) does not hold because −µ(−p1) < −µ(r) < Lt − qI .
In region A3, Lt− qI ∈ [Wt−µ(r), Wt]. If p = −h′(qI +Wt−Lt) ∈ [−r, 0], then (A.8) holds with
equality: Wt − (qI +Wt − Lt) = Lt − qI .
Lastly, in region A4, Lt − qI > Wt. If p = (CF )′(Lt −Wt − qI) > (CF )′(0), then (A.8) also holds
with equality: (Lt −Wt − qI) +Wt = Lt − qI .
Hence, the minimum price p for (A.8) to hold is exactly P (qI , Lt,Wt, S
F ).
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that the average price P (qI , βF ) decreases in qI , as we discussed after
the definition in (15). Furthermore, because Lt and Wt have continuous distributions, P (q
I , βF ) is
differentiable in qI everywhere. Denote P 1 ≡ ∂P/∂qI . We have P 1 ≤ 0.
Equation (25), qI − βIP (qI , βF ) = 0, implicitly determines qI as a function of βk, k ∈ GI ∪GF .








βI(1 − βIP 1)






< 0, j ∈ GF ,
where P 2 ≡ ∂P/∂βF < 0 is established below.
We will express P (qI , βF ) and derive P 2. To simplify notations, let random variables L and W
follow the probability distribution fL,W (x, y) defined in (32). Let D = L−W denote the net demand.
For a continuous random variable X, we use fX(x) and FX(x) to denote the probability density
and cumulative distribution functions, and we let FX(x) = 1− FX(x).
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Then, we can write the average price function in (24) as










(qI − x)fD(x) dx− ch
∫ qI−µ(r)
−∞
(qI − x)fL(x) dx























(βF )2 (1− βIP 1)
< 0, j ∈ GF . (A.11)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. We first bound the average price in (A.10). Note that
∫ qI
qI−µ(r)
(qI − x)fD(x) dx ≥ 0, and
∫ qI−µ(r)
−∞









Using these inequalities, the average price in (A.10) is bounded above by







− ahFD(qI) + (ah − r)FD(qI − µ(r)). (A.12)




−rFD(qI). If ah < r, then






− ahFD(qI). Combining these two cases, we obtain















































dy + (µD − qI)FD(qI)
≤ σD√
2π
+ (µD − qI)FD(qI). (A.14)
The inequalities (A.13) and (A.14) lead to








Using (25), (27), and (A.15), we have











We now prove qImax < µD. If the opposite is true, q
I max ≥ µD, then FD(qImax) ≥ 12 and (A.16)
implies

























. This contradicts qI max ≥ µD. Therefore, we conclude
that qImax < µD when σD ≤ σ∗D.
Proof of Theorem 3. Because generator k’s pure strategy set is a finite interval [βmink , c
−1
k ], it
suffices to show that, ∀ k ∈ GI ∪ GF , generator k’s profit function is quasi-concave with respect to
βk to prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (Debreu 1952).
The proof of the quasi-concavity will use the derivatives of P (qI , βF ). Differentiating P (qI , βF )
in (A.10) with respect to qI and using µ(r) = (r − ah)+/ch, we obtain
P 1(q












chµ(r) + (ah − r)
] [
fD(q








I)− FD(qI − µ(r)) + FL(qI − µ(r))
]
− ahfD(qI) + (ah − r)+
[
fD(q















I)− fD(qI − µ(r)) + fL(qI − µ(r))
]
− ahf ′D(qI) + (ah − r)+
[
f ′D(q




By Lemma 3, if σD ≤ σ∗D, we have qImax < µD. When qI < µD, and σD → 0, all the distribution
functions in (A.17)-(A.18) approach zero, except for FD(q
I), which approaches one. Therefore, when
σD is small, P 1 is close to −1/βF and P 11 is close to zero.
Quasi-concavity of IG’s profit function. The profit function of IG i ∈ GI is expressed as
πi(βi;β−i, β
F ) in (29). To prove its quasi-concavity in βi, we will show that its derivative ∂πi/∂βi
can cross zero value from above at most once as βi increases, while holding β−i and β
F constant.
In (29), the function QI(βI , βF ) is used to emphasize the dependence of the aggregate IG output
qI on βI and βF . In what follows, we use qI to denote QI(βI , βF ) when no confusion will rise. Note





























































= 1 − ciβi +
(
βi(1 + ciβ−i) − β−i
)
P 1. To show ∂πi/∂βi can cross zero value
from above at most once, it suffices to show X decreases in βi. Differentiating X with respect to βi,
∂X
∂βi
= −ci + (1 + ciβ−i)P 1 +
(






where P 11 is derived in (A.18). Note that −ci+(1+ciβ−i)P 1 < 0. Thus, if P 11(qI , βF ) is sufficiently
small, we can establish ∂X/∂βi ≤ 0. Based on the discussion after (A.17) and (A.18), there exists
σ̂D, such that when σD < σ̂D, we have ∂X/∂βi ≤ 0 and, therefore, πi is quasi-concave in βi.
Quasi-concavity of FG’s profit function. Using the probability distribution in (32), and denote
D = L−W and qI = QI(βI , βF ), we can write FG’s profit function in (31) as












We will show that ∂πj/∂βj can cross zero value at most once from above when βj increases.
Differentiating πj with respect to βj and using ∂q
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− (1 + cjβ−j)
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(1− βIP 1),















E [((D − qI)+)2] .
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(1− βIP 1) +
(β−j
βj











By the same argument used for the quasi-concavity of πi, we see that when σD is sufficiently small,
P 1 is close to −1/βF and P 11 is close to zero. Thus, there exists σ̃D, such that when σD < σ̃D, we
have ∂Y /∂βj ≤ 0.































E[(D − qI)+] .

































βF (1− βIP 1)
)]
.
We will show that ψ(qI) is close to FD(q
I) when σD is sufficiently small and q
I < µD to complete
the proof.
















= ((µD − qI)2 + σ2D)FD(qI) + σ2D(µD − qI)fD(qI),
ψ(qI) =
[
(µD − qI)FD(qI) + σ2DfD(qI)
]2
[
(µD − qI)2 + σ2D
]
FD(qI) + σ2D(µD − qI)fD(qI)
.
If σD ≤ σ∗D, we have qImax < µD (Lemma 3). The above expression for ψ(qI) implies that as σD → 0,
we have FD(q
I) → 1, fD(qI) → 0, and ψ(qI) → 1. Hence, there exists σ†D, such that when σD < σ
†
D,
we have ∂Z/∂βj ≤ 0.
To summarize, when σD < min{σ∗D, σ̂D, σ̃D, σ
†
D}, the profit function πj is quasi-concave in βj .
This establishes the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium, i.e., the linear supply function equilib-
rium.
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